Why do firms publicly echo government language? Two common explanations are noise, under which alignment is payoff-irrelevant, and government consumption, under which the regime rewards aligned firms because it directly values alignment. We propose a third explanation: the regime can use alignment to screen firms for costly political support. We develop a contracting framework encompassing all three explanations and derive two results. First, absent screening, alignment cannot predict differences in firms’ mean payoff responses or costly actions when political stress materializes. Second, under optimal screening, lower-cost firms align, provide greater support, and receive more favorable treatment. We test these predictions using a transparent measure constructed from listed Chinese firms’ use of regime-specific phrases in annual reports. More-aligned firms experience larger valuation losses after an adverse political shock and provide costly support by retaining more workers during local labor unrest. Within our framework, these responses rule in a screening role and are consistent with optimal screening.
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